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Hadlock: Civil Procedure: Expansion of the Rule Against Stae Appeals in Ju

CASE COMMENTS
CIVIL PROCEDURE: EXPANSION OF THE RULE
AGAINST STATE APPEALS IN JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY CASES*
D.A.E. v. State, 478 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1985)
The state filed a petition for delinquency forty-two days after the juvenile
had been taken into custody.' The trial court dismissed the petition because
the state had filed after the previously ordered seventy-two hour deadline. 2 The
state appealed- to the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal4 which reversed,
holding the trial court wrongfully shortened the forty-five day statutory deadline
for filing a delinquency petition.' The Florida Supreme Court accepted the
juvenile's petition for review to resolve a conflict of decisions.6 The court quashed
the Fifth District's decision and HELD, the state has no right to appeal as
juvenile proceedings are governed solely by the Florida Juvenile Justice Act
7
which does not provide for state appeals.
Under English common law a writ of error' would lie for the defendant

*Editor's Note: This comment received the George W. Milam Award for the outstanding case

comment Spring Semester, 1986.
1. State v. D.A.E., 456 So. 2d 569, 570 (5th D.C.A. 1984), quashed, 478 So. 2d 815 (Fla.
1985). The petitioner was charged with grand theft. Id.
2. Id. After petitioner had been taken into custody, the trial court, at the detention hearing,
appointed a public defender and required the state to file a petition for delinquency within 72
hours. On the date of arraignment, the state attorney told the court he was unable to file the
petition because he could not do so in good faith as required by FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.110(b). Id.
3. Id. The issue on appeal was whether the juvenile court could properly require the state
to file its petition for delinquency in less than the 45-day limit granted by statute. Id.; cf. FLA.
STAT. S 39.05(6) (1985) (prescribing dismissal of petitions alleging delinquency which are not filed
within 45 days of date child was taken into custody).
4. See State v. W.A.M., 412 So. 2d 49 (5th D.C.A.) (establishing the right to appeal by
state in juvenile cases in this district), petition for rev. denied, 419 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 1982).
5. State v. D.A.E., 456 So. 2d 569, 571 (5th D.C.A. 1984), quashed, 478 So. 2d 815 (Fla.
1985). The juvenile's counsel argued that even though FLA. STAT. S 39.05(6) (1985) provided for
dismissal of a delinquency petition after 45 days, this did not prohibit the trial court from setting
a shorter filing deadline. The court rejected this argument and analogized to Lisak v. State, 433
So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1983). 456 So. 2d at 571. In Li'ak, the Florida Supreme Court held a juvenile
could not seek an adjudicatory hearing within the 21-day limit, provided by FLA. STAT. S 39.02(5Xc)2
(1985), during which the state may seek a grand jury indictment. 433 So. 2d at 489.
6. 478 So. 2d 815, 815 (Fla. 1985). Where there is a conflict of decisions, the Florida
Supreme Court has jurisdiction. FLA. CoNsr. art. V, S 3(bX3).
7. 478 So. 2d at 815; see also State v. Creighton, 469 So. 2d 735, 740 (Fla. 1985) (holding
the right of appeal in criminal cases is governed strictly by statute); State v. C.C., 476 So. 2d
144, 146 (Fla. 1985) (holding the Juvenile Justice Act, FLA. STAT. ch. 39 (1985), does not grant
the state a right of appeal in juvenile cases).
8. See People v. Barber, 348 Il1. 40, 180 N.E. 633 (1932) (discussing writs of error at English
common law); State v. Hardy, 339 Mo. 897, 98 S.W.2d 593 (1936). At common law, a writ of
error was used to indicate a review of the judgment by a higher court limited to the lower court
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but not for the state.9 Statutory law replaced the writ of error for suits at law
with appeal."' Prior to 1956, the state's right to appeal in a criminal case was
purely statutory." In 1956, article V of the Florida Constitution was amended
to provide for the creation of district courts of appeal and to define the appellate
jurisdiction of such courts. 2 The judiciary interpreted this amendment as providing the state with a constitutional right to appeal."'
In 1972, article V was again amended.' 4 The Florida Supreme Court interpreted the effect of this revision on the state's right to appeal in Stale v.
Creighton.' The state petitioned for review of the district court's dismissal of its

record; an appeal in English equity courts was a de novo trial in a higher court. Id. at 899, 98
S.W.2d at 594.
9. See United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310 (1892); see also State v. Burns, 18 Fla. 185,
187 (1881) ("The weight of authority is overwhelming, not only in this country but in England,
that the writ will not lie at the instance of the State.").
10. Act of June 11, 1945, 1945 Fla. Laws, ch. 22854, 5 1 (repealed 1971) ("Review in this
state by writ of error is abolished. All relief heretofore obtainable by writ of error may hereafter
be obtained by appeals as in equity."). &e generally State v. Hardy, 339 Mo. 897, 98 S.W.2d 593
(1936) (writs of error governed by statute).
11. See Whidden v. State, 159 Fla. 691, 692, 32 So. 2d 577, 578 (1947) (holding the exception
to the common law rule against state appeals in criminal cases was governed by FLA. STAT. ch.
924 (1985) (appeals)); see also State v. Burns, 18 Fla. 185, 187 (1881) ("it is evident from the
character of the legislation on the subject in this State that it has been contemplated that the State
could further pursue parties who had obtained judgement in their favor in prosecutions by indictment"). There was no express provision for methods of obtaining review to the Florida Supreme
Court, then the only appellate court in the state. Cf. FLA. CoNsr. of 1885, art. V, 5 5 (1956).
("The supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction in all cases at law and in equity originating
in circuit courts.").
12. FLA. CoNsr. of 1885 art. V, § 5(3) (1956).
Jurisdiction. Appeals from trial courts in each appellate district, and from final orders
or decrees of county judge's courts pertaining to probate matters or to estates and interests
of minors and incompetents, may be taken to the court of appeal of such district, as a
matter of right, from all final judgments or decrees except those from which appeals may
be taken direct to the supreme court or to a circuit court.
The supreme court shall provide for expeditious and inexpensive procedure in appeals
to the district courts of appeal, and may provide for review by such courts of interlocutory
orders or decrees in matters reviewable by the district courts of appeal.
The district courts of appeal shall have such powers of direct review of administrative
action as may be provided by law.
Id.
13. Crownover v. Shannon, 170 So. 2d 299, 301 (Fla. 1964); accord State v. W.A.M., 412
So. 2d 49 (5th D.C.A.) (citing Crownover as support for proposition that the 1972 revision to article
V of the Florida Constitution also creates a state right to appeal), petition for rev. denied, 419 So.
2d 1201 (Fla. 1982); cf. [1955-19561 FLA. Arr'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 884 (limits of appeal would
not change with the 1956 amendment unless the Florida Supreme Court or legislature changed
them).
14. FLA. CoNs. art. V, S 4(bXl) (1968, amended 1972) ("District courts of appeal shall
have jurisdiction to hear appeals, that may be taken as a matter of right, from final judgments
or orders of trial courts ... not directly appealable to the supreme court or a circuit court.").
15. 469 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1985) (court took jurisdiction on the basis of a conflict of decision
as authorized by FLA. CONSr. art. V, S 3(bX4)); see State v. W.A.M., 412 So. 2d 49, 50 (5th
D.C.A.), petition for rev. denied, 419 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 1982). In W.A.M., the state appealed from
an order of the juvenile court dismissing the charges on the grounds of the juvenile "speedy trial"
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appeal in a criminal case."' The court held a state's right to appeal is governed
strictly by statute. 7 The language of article V was revised from "appeals . . .
may be taken .. . as a matter of right" in the 1956 provision 8 to "appeals,
that may be taken as a matter of right" in the 1972 provision."' The court
reasoned constitutional interpretation requires a presumption of intentional alteration for a substantial and material language change in a revision.2 " Additionally, under standard English usage, "that" is a restrictive pronoun which
qualifies its antecedent noun.2' Thus the clause "appeals, that may be taken
as a matter of right" 2 indicates a source outside the constitution must be used
to determine when an appeal is a substantive right.z!
Chapter 924 of the Florida Statutes defines the state's right to appeal in
criminal cases.2 4 In State v. C. C. ,25 the Florida Supreme Court, despite a strong
dissent by Chief Justice Boyd, rejected the state's argument that chapter 924
27
2
also applies in juvenile cases. 6 The court held the Florida Juvenile Justice Act

rule, The court held the state has a constitutional right to appeal from final judgments in juvenile
cases. Id.
16. 469 So. 2d at 735-36 (defendant charged with arson and failure to put out the fire or
activate fire alarm).
17. Id. at 740.
18. FLA. CONST. of 1885 art. V, § 5(3) (1956).
19. FLA. CONsT. art. V, S 4(b)(1) (1968, amended 1972).
20. 469 So. 2d at 739 (citing In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 112 So. 2d 843 (Fla.
1959); Swartz v. State, 316 So. 2d 618 (Ist D.C.A. 1975), petition.for rev.
denied, 333 So. 2d 465
(Fla. 1976)). In Advisory Opinion, the court applied the "substantial change" rule of interpretation
to determine that a revision of the Florida Constitution which omitted "absence from the state"
as a basis for inability of the governor to perform his duties eliminated that reason as a basis for
inability. 112 So. 2d at 846-47.
Even after the 1956 revision of article V, Florida courts still treated the state's right to appeal
as only statutory in criminal cases. See, e.g., Carrol v. State, 251 So. 2d 866, 870 (Fla. 1971);
State v. Schroeder, 112 So. 2d 257, 259 (Fla. 1959). Following the 1972 revision to article V,
courts in civil cases treated the state's right to appeal as controlled by statute. See, e.g., Clement
v. Aztec, 297 So. 2d 1, 1-2 (Fla. 1974); State v. I.B., 366 So. 2d 186, 186-87 (Fla. 1st D.C.A.
1979).
21.

469 So. 2d at 739 (citing W. STRUNK & E. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS

OF

STYLE 53 (1972)).

FLA. CONsT. art. V, 5 4(b)(1) (1968, amended 1972).
469 So. 2d at 739 (citing H. FOWLER, MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 713 (1937); M. KAMMER
& C. MULLIGAN, WRITING HANDBOOK 117-18, 138, 151-52 (1953)).
24. FLA. STAT. S 924.07(1) (1985) provides the state with right to appeal from dismissal of
an indictment or information in a criminal case, and FLA. STAT. S 924.071(1) (1985) provides the
state with the right to appeal pretrial orders in which state evidence is suppressed.
25. 476 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1985). The case was taken as a certified question of great public
importance on ground of conflict among the district courts of appeal. Compare State v. J.P.W.,
433 So. 2d 616 (4th D.C.A. 1983) (holding state has right to appeal), quashed, 476 So. 2d 148
(Fla. 1985) and State v. W.A.M., 412 So. 2d 49 (5th D.C.A.) (same), pelitionfor rev. denied, 419
So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 1982) with State v. G.P., 429 So. 2d 786 (3d D.C.A. 1983) (holding state has
no right to appeal), al'd, 476 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 1985). This issue was recently reconsidered in
E.N. v. State, 484 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 1986) (no statute provides state with right of appeal in
juvenile cases).
26. 476 So. 2d at 146. In a partial dissent, Chief Justice Boyd argued chapter 924 did apply
because of the similar nature of juvenile delinquency and criminal matters. Id. at 146-48.
27. FLA. STAT. ch. 39 (1985).
22.
23.
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which does not provide for state appeals, governs juvenile proceedings.2 8 While
juvenile delinquency cases are criminal in nature, the court noted the statutes
governing juvenile proceedings are based on a policy of offender rehabilitation
rather than retribution.2 9 The moral, emotional, mental and physical well-being
of the child are interwoven with the best interests of the state."" The state seeks
to provide the child with proper care, guidance, and control, preferably in each
child's own home." To achieve these goals, juvenile proceedings mandate ex2
peditious handling of charges and claims.1
Counter policy and constitutional arguments favoring a state right to appeal
were considered by the Florida Supreme Court in J.P. W. v. State." The Florida
Fourth District Court of Appeal3 4 held the state had a constitutional right to
appeal in juvenile cases. 3 The 1972 amendment to article V 3 ' provides: "District
courts of appeal shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals, that may be taken as
a matter of right." ' s7 The district court interpreted the phrase "that may be
38
taken as a matter or right" to create a substantive right to appeal. Also, if
juvenile proceedings were either purely civil or criminal in nature, the state
would be entitled to appeal.'. The district court reasoned it would be inequitable
to deny the state a right to appeal solely because of the unique nature of
juvenile proceedings, neither purely civil nor purely criminal in nature. 4 " The
Florida Supreme Court quashed the decision and applied the doctrine in C. C.,
holding a state has no constitutional or statutory right to appeal in juvenile
4
proceedings. '
Applying the C.C. doctrine of no state right to appeal in juvenile cases, the
instant court agreed the issue presented had been previously resolved. 4" The
court's per curiam decision presented no new reasoning against the arguments
for a state right of appeal. 43 The instant court did not directly consider the

28. 476 So. 2d at 146; see FLA. STAT. S 39.14(1) (1985) ("Any child, affected by an order
of the court may appeal to the appropriate district court of appeal within the time and in the
manner prescribed by the Florida Appellate Rules.").
29. 476 So. 2d at 146 (citing FLA. STAT. S 39.001(2)(a) (1985) to indicate the purpose of
Juvenile Justice Act was to replace retribution with rehabilitation).
30. See

FLA. STAT.

5 39.001 (1985).

31. See id. S 39.001(2)(b).
32. 476 So. 2d at 146.
33. 476 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1985).
34. State v. J.P.W., 433 So. 2d 616 (4th D.C.A. 1983) (the state's petition for juvenile

delinquency had been dismissed on ground of violation of the speedy trial rule), quashed, 476 So.
2d 148 (Fla. 1985).
35. Id. at 620.
36. See supra text accompanying notes 14-23.
37. FLA. CoNST. art. V, S 4(b)(1) (1968, amended 1972).
38. State v. J.P.W., 433 So. 2d 616, 619 (4th D.C.A. 1983), quashed, 476 So. 2d 148 (Fla.

1985).
39. Id. (citing

40.
41.
42.
43.

FLA.

R. App. P. 9.140(c)(1)(E)).

Id.
J.P.W., 476 So. 2d at 148.
478 So. 2d at 815.
See id.
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argument that the 1972 revision of article V created a right of appeal or that
the unique nature of juvenile proceedings should not foreclose the state's right
to appeal. Instead, the court recognized the validity of the doctrine in C.C..44
The instant court reaffirmed the governance of the Florida Juvenile Justice Act
over juvenile proceedings which does not provide the state with a right to
appeal. 4 The court also acknowledged the continuing validity of the Creighton
doctrine denying the state any substantive right to appeal under the Florida
Constitution.4 The court reasoned in light of Creighton and C.C., the decision
4 7
below erroneously provided the state with appellate review.
Chief Justice Boyd, in a partial concurrence, retracted his position in the
dissent of C.C. which stated chapter 924 did provide the state with a right to
appeal in juvenile cases.4 He acknowledged the majority opinion in C.C. resolved the issue and no statutory provision exists for state appeals in juvenile
cases.4 9 However, Chief Justice Boyd recommended remanding the case to allow
the district court to consider treating the state appeal as a petition for certiorari.50 He advocated an exception to the rule barring appeals because the
trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law by imposing a
time restraint not required or permitted by statutes.5 '
If viewed in isolation, the interpretation of article V in 1972 by the district
court in J. P. W. appears rational. 5 2 It seems unreasonable to interpret the language "appeals, that may be taken as a matter of right" as merely an indication
to look outside the constitution to find a right to appeal.5 3 The district court
in JP. W., however, failed to consider the history of article V. The substantial
change in language from "appeals . . . may be taken . . . as a matter of right"
to "appeals, that may be taken . . . as a matter of right" must be presumed

44. Id.; seealso supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text (discussing C.C.).
45. 478 So. 2d at 815.
46. Id.; see also supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text (discussing Creighton).
47. 478 So. 2d at 815. The court stated: "Under the recent decisions, it is clear that the
state had no right to appeal the circuit court's order dismissing the delinquency petition in the
instant case. Therefore the district court of appeal should not have provided appellate review of
the juvenile court's order of dismissal." Id.
48. Id. at 816.
49. Id.
50. Id. Chief Justice Boyd suggested the district court may have treated the appeal as a
petition for certiorari if it knew the state could not appeal. Id.
51. Id. (citing Jones v. State, 477 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 1985), for the proposition that certiorari
is merited where lower courts depart from essential requirements of the law).
52. See State v. J.P.W., 433 So. 2d 616, 619 (4th D.C.A. 1983), quashed, 476 So. 2d 148
(Fla. 1985).
53. See id.
There either is a right to appeal or there is not. To treat the quoted language as

limiting the appeal jurisdiction of the district courts to those situations in which there is
a "right"

to appeal would be meaningless. This is somewhat equivalent to saying the

court shall have jurisdiction to hear an appeal where there is a right to appeal but shall
not have jurisdiction where there is no right to appeal. The possibility that such an unreasonable construction was intended in so wording the constitution cannot be presumed.
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to change the effect of the provision. 4 By following the interpretation in Creighton
that statutory law dictates a state's right to appeal, the instant court brought
the law on this issue back to its status before the 1956 amendment to article
V.

55

Chapter 924 governs state appeals in criminal cases.5 6 Dissenting in C. C.,
Chief Justice Boyd argued chapter 924 should also apply to juvenile delinquency
cases because juvenile delinquency matters are of the same nature as criminal
matters.5 7 He reasoned that just as the state may appeal the dismissal of a
criminal indictment, it should also have a right to appeal the dismissal of a
petition for juvenile delinquency. "s However in C.C., the Florida Supreme Court
held juvenile matters are governed solely by the Florida Juvenile Justice Act
which does not provide for state appeals.59 In following C.C., the instant court
recognized the important distinction between criminal and juvenile delinquency
cases. While the offenses may be similar or even identical in both types of
cases, the policy considerations underlying the judicial treatment of the offenders
are very different."
The Florida Juvenile Justice Act is based on a policy of rehabilitation and
restitution rather than retribution.6 ' By relying on the Act, the C. C. court
implicitly acknowledged that the moral, emotional, mental and physical wellbeing of the juvenile coincide with the best interest of the state.6 2 The introductory sections of the Act expressly state that the legislative goal is to assure
all children of Florida proper care, guidance, and control, preferably in the
child's own home.63 In following C.C., the instant court promoted the simpli-

54. See, e.g., In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 112 So. 2d 843, 846 (Fla. 1959) (court
applied "substantial change" rule of interpretation to revision of the Florida Constitution and
determined omission of "absence from the state" as a basis for inability of the governor to perform
his duties meant this reason was no longer a basis for inability).
55. See Whidden v. State, 159 Fla. 691, 32 So. 2d 577 (1947) (holding a state's right to
appeal as purely statutory).
56. FLA. STAT. eh. 924 (1985).
57. C.C., 476 So. 2d at 147.
58. Id.; see FLA. STAT. 5 924.07 (1985) ("The state may appeal from: (1) an order dismissing
an indictment or information on any count thereof."). Chief Justice Boyd also reasoned that
suppression of evidence was the same whether in a juvenile delinquency case or in a criminal case.
476 So. 2d at 147; see FLA. STAT. S 924.071(1) (1985) ("The state may appeal from a pretrial
order dismissing a search warrant, suppressing evidence obtained by search and seizure, or suppressing a confession or admission made by a defendant. The appeal must be taken before the
trial.").
59. 476 So. 2d at 146 (reasoning that since chapter 924 provides for defendant appeals, the
provision in chapter 39 providing for appeals by the child, parent or guardian indicates legislature
did not intend for chapter 924 to apply in juvenile cases).
60. See id.
61. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. 9 39.001(2) (1985)).
62. See FLA. STAT. S 39.001(2)(b) (1985) ("To assure to all children brought to the attention
of the courts ... the care, guidance, and control, preferably in each child's own home, which
will best serve the moral . .. and physical welfare of the child and the best interests of the state.").
63. Id.
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fication and expediency necessary in juvenile proceedings to effect the goals and
64
policies underlying the Florida Juvenile Justice Act.
The underlying policies in dealing with juvenile delinquency matters require
65
Impleseparate proceedings and separate rules governing those proceedings.
mentation of those policies, however, does not mandate a return to the common
law rule allowing a writ of error for the defendant but not for the state. 66 The
facts of the instant case present a situation not considered in previous cases67
In the instant case, the trial court required the state to file a petition for
delinquency within seventy-two hours in contravention of the statutory provision
allowing forty-five days. 6 By applying the rule against state appeals rather than
allowing an exception due to the trial court's departure from the statutory
guidelines, the instant court has expanded the rule. Under the ruling of the
instant court, a state may not appeal even where the trial court dismisses the
petition for delinquency on grounds which depart from essential requirements
69
of the law.
The instant court implies judicial expediency outweighs the danger of judicial
abuse of discretion. That is, when the legislative goals furthered by simple and
expeditious juvenile proceedings are balanced against the dangers of abuse of
discretion by the trial court, the former should prevail. Though Chief Justice
Boyd now agrees the state has no statutory right of appeal, he also dissents
from the result of the instant case. 7" He suggests where the trial court departs
from essential requirements of the law, an exception to the general rule against
state appeals should be created. 7
The concern for the emotional, mental and physical well-being of the child
underlies the statutes governing juvenile proceedings.7 2 As children are the state's

64. Cf C.C., 476 So. 2d at 146 (discussing policy of Juvenile Justice Act). The C.C. court
noted expediency is also promoted in juvenile proceedings by denying a juvenile the right to a
jury trial. Id. Thus, both the state and the juvenile bear part of the burden accompanying the
promotion of legislative policies.
65. Id.
66. See State v. Burns, 18 Fla. 185 (1881) ("The weight of authority is overwhelming, not
only in this country but in England, that the writ will not lie at the instance of the State.")
67. See State v. D.A.E., 456 So. 2d 569, 570 (5th D.C.A. 1984), quashed, 478 So. 2d 815
(Fla. 1985).
68. Id.
69. 478 So. 2d at 815. Chief Justice Boyd, in a dissenting opinion, proposed that appeals
should be treated as petitions for certiorari where the lower court departs from essential requirements
of the law. Id. at 816; see Jones v. State, 477 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 1985).
70. 478 So. 2d at 816 (Chief Justice Boyd would remand to the district court).

71.
72.

Id.
See FLA. STAT. S 39.002 (1985).
Legislative intent. It is a goal of the Legislature that the children of this state be

provided with the following protections:
(1) A permanent and stable home.
(2)

A safe and nurturing environment which will preserve a sense of personal dignity

and integrity.
(3) Adequate nutrition, shelter and clothing.
(4) Effective treatment to address physical, social, and emotional needs, regardless of
geographical location.
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most valuable resource, their best interests are inextricably entwined with the
best interests of the state. 73 Denying the state a substantive right to appeal in
juvenile cases simplifies juvenile cases and so promotes a quick adjudication of
juvenile delinquency matters. 74 Assuring trial court judges do not abuse their
discretion by placing constraints on the state which are neither required nor
permitted by applicable statutes and rules is also an important public interest.7
Where the state suffers an adverse order or judgment as a result of the trial
court's departure from essential requirements of the law, an exception should
76
be made to the rule against state appeals in juvenile cases.
Timothy Hadlock

(5) Protection from abuse, neglect, and exploitation ....
Id.
73. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
74. See C.C.', 476 So. 2d at 146; sewalso supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (discussing
Florida Juvenile Justice Act).
75. 478 So. 2d at 816. Chief Justice Boyd in his dissent in the instant case suggests the
district court may have treated the appeal as a writ of certiorari if it knew the state had no right
of appeal. Id.
76. Id.
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